The Arab Spring Revolutions

Mehdi Noorbaksh

Associate Professor of International Affairs Harrisburg University of Science and Technology 

President, Southwestern International Studies Association

Vice-President, World Affairs Council, Harrisburg

Fellow, Center for International Studies, University of St. Thomas, Houston

On February 15, 1991, in the aftermath of the First Gulf War, President George H. W. Bush announced that “There is another way for the bloodshed to stop. And that is, for the Iraqi military and the Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands and force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside.” This statement encouraged thousands in the predominantly Shiite southern region of Iraq to rise against the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. The Iraqis expected that their uprising against the authoritarian regime of Baghdad would be supported by the United States. It was not, and the uprising was put down brutally by Saddam Hussein. Saddam subdued opposition and conquered the South with an unprecedented level of cruelty and carnage. 

President George W. Bush invaded Iraq in March 2003 with the presumption that Saddam was a threat to the United States and the world with his efforts in building weapons of mass destruction. As these presumed weapons  were not found, the mission changed to democracy promotion in Iraq.  President Bush viewed democracy promotion as a critical instrument in the long-term war against terrorism. This “coercive democracy” strategy involved invasion and occupation and it became the corner stone of American foreign policy under his administration. He stated in December 2006, “[We] are committed to a strategic goal of a free Iraq that is democratic, that can govern itself, defend itself and sustain itself.” The “war on terror” encouraged the Bush administration to heavily invest in authoritarian regimes throughout the Middle East including Mubarak in Egypt and Salih in Yemen. They became partners in Washington’s war against terror. They later convinced the United States that Washington’s support of their regimes would lead to their stability and strength and would colossally benefit the strategy of the administration in the war against terrorism.  For that reason, Washington strengthened its ties with these regimes, ignoring their brutality against their own people and their violation of the rights and freedom of the citizens of these nations. 

In June 2009, President Obama declared in his Cairo speech, “Each nation gives life to this principle (democracy) in its own way, grounded in the traditions of its own people. America does not presume to know what is best for everyone, just as we would not presume to pick the outcome of a peaceful election. But I do have an unyielding belief that all people yearn for certain things: the ability to speak your mind and have a say in how you are governed; confidence in the rule of law and equal administration of justice; government that is transparent and doesn’t steal from people; the freedom to live as you choose. Those are not just American ideas, they are human rights, and that is why we will support them everywhere.” This speech raised hope in the Middle East and the Muslim world as many speculated that the United States intended to change the course of its foreign policy to one in which it would support democratic movements and end its support of authoritarian regimes, especially in the Middle East. With high hope for change following President Obama’s speech, many were disappointed later to observe no change in Washington’s relations with the authoritarian regimes of the Middle East.  Middle Eastern people, specifically, lost hope in the notion that the United States would genuinely support democratic change in the region and become involved in the initiation of peace throughout the region.

More than anything else, the example of Turkey rather than Iran has inspired many in the Middle East over the last decade to strive for democratic changes, and many believed that democratic change would be possible both under secularism and Islamism. Although Muslims participated in establishing stable democratic societies and governments in countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia and actively participated in democratic politics in countries such as India and in the other parts of the world, a group of scholars in the West, before and after the introduction of the “conflict of civilizations,” concluded that the countries of the Middle East are not capable of and adept in embracing democratic norms because their predominant religion, Islam, is not compatible with democracy. Human rights, democratic norms, woman rights and participatory politics were considered the sole monopoly of the West and alien to this region. This tendency that was called neo-orientalism in the literature of the region shared its conceptual framework with past orientalists who separated Orient and the West in the realm of culture, society, politics, modernity and civilization. 

Authoritarian regimes of the region were occasionally open to discuss their belief that people of the region were not ready to embrace democracy. Umar Suleiman, the Egyptian politician who was chosen by Mubarak to rescue his regime in the last days of the Egyptian revolution, contended in one of his interviews that Egypt was not ready for democracy.  For their own reasons, authoritarian regimes in the Middle East share with the neo-orientalists the belief that since democracy cannot take root in this region, they are the best fit for government. 

Disappointed with Washington’s policy toward the region, especially in regard to encouraging democratic change, and demoralized by the level of brutality and disrespect these regimes showed for the basic rights of their citizens, the Arab youth began to force change in these nations. However, contrary to the perception that tends to amplify the role of economy and unemployment as causes of change in the Middle East and North Africa, the Arab Spring Revolutions pondered on the rights and modern notions of self government through the rule of law, accountability and participatory politics. The revolution started in Tunisia, a North African country of ten million people. The spark came with the violation of the rights of Mohammad Bouazizi who protested against the authorities who affronted him and seized the sole means of his and his family’s sustenance. Bouazizi set himself ablaze in the city of Sidi Bouzid on December 17^th, 2010 in protest of the injustice and violations of his rights by the Tunisian government. The dictatorship of Tunisia under Zein al-Abideen Ben Ali collapsed after 28 days of continuous protest in January 14^th 2011. His dictatorial rule ended after he spent 23 years in power.

The Egyptian revolution inspired by the Tunisian revolution and the process leading up to it began on January 25^th, but the seed of the Egyptian revolution had also been planted by Khalid Mohammad Said, a 28 year old Egyptian who died mysteriously under the custody of the police in the Sidi Gaber area of Alexandria on June 6, 2010. He was apparently beaten to death by Egyptian security forces. Photos of his disfigured corpse were disseminated on the internet and a prominent Facebook group raised awareness about his death with the slogan, “We are all Khalid Said.”   The Egyptian youth involved in the April 6 Movement, the We are Khalid Said, , the  Kefaya Movement and others called for mass protest on January 25^th with simple requests of the Mubarak regime, which included ending the state of emergency,  dismissing the interior minister responsible for the government’s violations of human rights, establishing an independent judiciary system, carrying out political reform, dissolving the parliament in anticipation of a fresh new election and addressing poverty and unemployment.  In a country with a population of 85 million, and with millions participating in the protest, it took 18 days for the collapse of the regime of Mubarak who ruled the country arbitrarily for 30 years.

On February 15^th, 2011, people in the mostly desert and tribal country of Libya with a population of 6.5 million, marched to free a human rights lawyer, Fathi Terbil, who was representing the families of the political prisoners being held at Abu Salim prison in the southern city of Benghazi. The revolution began against the brutal regime of Qaddafi who ruled the country for 41 years. In the same month another revolutionary upheaval began in Yemen against the dictatorship of Ali Abdullah Salih who ruled this country with an iron fist for 33 years. In Bahrain, the al-Khalifa family ruled the country since the 18^th century and for more than two centuries. The minority Sunni population ruled over the majority Shiite population without respecting the rights of this majority to participate equally in the politics of the nation. Beginning in the middle of March, the Syrian government faced revolution and upheaval in the city of Daraa. The regimes’ brutality can be compared only with Iran in suppressing the Green Movement after the 2009 fraudulent election and Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi after the rise of opposition to his despotic regime starting in February.  These three regimes have shown that they will not hesitate to resort to violence in achieving the ultimate goal of suppressing dissent. In February 1982, the Syrian government under Hafiz Asad massacred thousands in Hama, a city on the bank of the Orontez River in central Syria.  Against the monarchies of Jordan, Oman, Morocco and in new Iraq, people rose up to demand their rights that were violated by autocratic rule and rulers who rejected their rights to political participation and democratic norms in government and society.

The Arab Spring Revolutions were aimed at two crucial problems in the politics and society of these nations that underwent and are currently undergoing transformation.  Arab dignity and rights were at the core of the demand for change. Dignity in the convoluted history of these societies has a very distinct meaning and inference.  Most of the countries of the Arab world have not experienced independence and freedom in the modern history of their nations in almost 150 years. In the case of Tunisia, the country was colonized by the French in 1881. An independence movement against colonial rule prevailed in 1954. But still the country stayed under indirect colonial rule under which the French controlled its army and foreign affairs according to an agreed convention created in 1955. On March 20, 1956, Tunisia achieved full sovereignty but the French imposed on it a monarchical system.  Finally in July 1957, the monarchy was abolished and Habib Bourghiba under the Neo-Dastour Party took over the country as its president. Bourghiba was an autocrat who was fully supported by the French. After Bourghiba, Ben Ali ascended to the helm of power in November 1987.  Both Bourghiba and Ben Ali had ties to the military and were supported by their French patrons. They ruled the country arbitrarily and incessantly crushed dissent and demands for rights and political participation.

In 1860, Khedive Ismail in Egypt took advantage of the vastly inflated cotton price as a result of the American Civil War. He attempted to build a modern economy, but his hopes were dashed as the economy was badly mismanaged and cotton prices dropped in the global market. As the result of deterioration in the economy and over a loan of 976,587 British Pounds, the British took over control of the Suez Canal. Egypt indebtness encouraged other Europeans to extract more concessions from the country.  In 1879, Egypt was placed under the dual control of the British and the French. Ahmed Urabi, a military officer, revolted against the British and the French.  He became the leader and the symbol of anti-colonial movement in that country. In 1882, the French and British fleets were brought to Alexandria to ensure the safety of the Suez Canal. The British bombarded the city and suppressed the nationalist uprising led by Urabi. The British stayed in Egypt until 1956. In July 1952, a group of military officers under the leadership of General Mohammad Najib overthrew King Farough. Naser came to power and later nationalized the Suez Canal.

These three countries, similar to many others in this region, were ruled by the military directly or indirectly after a prolonged period of colonialization. The brutality of colonial control took away the sense of security in these societies as seen today. Only the military could have responded to this sense of insecurity. But as military regimes took over in these societies, they ruled with an iron fist and total impunity. This new sense of insecurity coupled later with the insecurity that these people and regimes experienced during the Cold War between the former Soviet Union and the United States. The establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, the tensions of war and conflicts, in addition to the United States’ support for the most authoritarian regimes of the Middle East during the Cold War, left no room for the countries of the region and their people to debate pertinent political issues in government and society and did not give the people of these countries any chance to establish civil societies in these nations.  Armed with the support and arms of the United States and the West, regimes such Sadat and Mubarak expanded their arbitrary rule and control of these societies. When Arabs talk about dignity, they talk about the dignity of generations that, under colonialism, war and conflicts of the Cold War, lost their grip on debates and spaces in which they could establish the bounds of a free and democratic society and political arena.

The Arab Spring Revolution has been carried out by a generation that is young and highly educated. This generation is very idealistic and persistent.  It includes both young men and women who are not convinced that they are able to compromise on certain principles, rights and democratic norms for which they carried out these uprisings and revolutions. Among all, the Egyptian model shows much more resilience and persistence compared to other current transformations. The youth took ownership of the revolution from its early inception.  At the onset, the youth of Egypt did not know what the outcome of their uprising would be but during the course of the uprising, they understood the limits of their demands, the kind of pressure they could exert on the government and finally how to mobilize to achieve their goals. They demanded the banning of Mubarak’s National Democratic Party, the dissolution of all local councils, the replacement of the governors, the arrest and trial of certain notorious figures in the previous government and finally the arrest and trial of Mubarak and his sons who were coconspirators in their father’s corruption and tyranny. They have achieved most of these demands and continue to push for the rest. Their persistence and participation could guarantee fair and free elections and more than that, could bring about their full participation in the politics of the country.

Taqadum al-Katib and Asma’a Mahfouz, two of the youth involved and a male and female respectively, were among the organizers of the uprising. From the early days, they broke the barriers of gender in the politics of a country that is experiencing a new era in participatory politics. This is perhaps the first time in the history of modern Egypt that women have been involved to such a great extent in shaping and molding the new politics of political participation.  This has signaled a new era in gender relations in a society in which barriers to equality between the male and female have existed in the past. This transition to a modern era will open the door to greater opportunities for all Egyptians to equally respect participation in rebuilding a new polity and society.

The Spring Revolutions, especially the Egyptian model, broke the monopoly on information as exercised by one group in society. The youth’s skills in managing social media and ability to mobilize through this medium totally incapacitated an authoritarian regime that monopolized the dissemination of information in that society. Although the regime of Mubarak diligently attempted to constrain access to social media, it lost that battle to the youth who knew better how to manage it.  Although the precedent established in this area by the youth of Egypt does not guarantee the freedom of information and expression, it could usher in a new era in the politics of Egypt if coupled with their persistence.  The Egyptian youth and all youths involved in the Arab Spring Revolutions have understood the importance of freedom of expression and freedom in accessing information. This will offer a greater incentive for them to safeguard these freedoms in the process of building strong civil societies in their countries.

Egypt, like Turkey, had a long history of military involvement in politics. The predominance of an insecure environment both in Egypt and countries such as Tunisia led to domination of military regimes. These environments do not exist either in Egypt or in other countries such as Tunisia for the military to intervene. There is also the well established norm of non-violence that was adhered to from the beginning of all of these revolutions and great transformations.  These movements well understood early on that if arms were used in winning the battle for change, the winner would always be the regime that has more power and expertise in using violence and intimidation. These peaceful revolutions disarmed regimes which intended to provoke a violent reaction. This tradition of non-violence, coupled with the persistent efforts in participation in politics and the shaping of a future civil society, will undermine any efforts at resorting to violence and arms in these societies. As new civilian governments are established and people are encouraged to stay the course in reshaping their government, the military will continue to lose its ability to impose itself on the political processes. These revolutions, especially the one in Egypt, learned how to neutralize the army. The cases of Libya and Bahrain are different in that the people are being ruled by desperate individuals seeking to hold power at any cost and in the latter case, the country is currently being occupied by foreign forces that are aiding in suppressing revolt. These foreign forces from nations neighboring Bahrain are afraid of the future changes in this country that could ultimately jeopardize the political stability in their own nations and especially undermine the rule of monarchy in that part of the world. 

These revolutions have also succeeded in dismantling the foundation of ethnic and religious discrimination and division.  The participation of women and their leadership in these uprisings, especially in Egypt, have changed gender relations.  Similarly, the participation of all religious minorities, particularly the Coptic Church in Egypt, has changed another social dimension in these countries. The new alliance forged for change will help these nations deal more effectively with gender, ethnic and religious differences.  The new dawn in the politics of these nations will question old mores in society because the youth is at the forefront of these changes. The youth revolutionaries have defied the old perception of division and defeated discrimination in these nations. In Egypt, the younger Muslim Brothers split with the old guard because their demand for change was much more profound and inclusive than their predecessors.  In almost all countries of the Middle East, the demand to separate government from religion and to shape inclusive pluralistic politics is well known. The experience of Iran and the level of tension that the Iranian political model and government has created internally and externally are obviously well observed in the Arab world. Although involved in the Arab revolutions, none of the religious groups were convinced or encouraged to receive credit for many of these great transformations. The culture of pluralism and inclusiveness is developing through the societies under these revolutionary changes.

The authoritarian regimes from the Shah of Iran to Mubarak in Egypt were heavily involved in westernizing their societies at the expense of genuine modernization. Modernization of economy demands modernization of politics and society. The lack of interest of these regimes in engaging in a genuine modernization scheme alienated the majority in these societies. Although few societies have succeeded in establishing a modern economy as China has done, for instance, the risk of alienation and opposition to the dominant politics is always present. In the Middle East, it has been proven repeatedly that true modernization means a change in economics, politics and society’s institutions.  The Arab Spring Revolutions could usher in a new era in modernizing all aspects of these societies. With a new generation on the forefront of these efforts, this is a crucial chance for all of these countries to use this energetic and intellectual resource for the welfare of their societies.

Although these revolutions did not subscribe to any particular ideology, the sense of nationalism and pride is pervasive in all of these nations. Nationalism and its promotion in the past belonged to military rulers who took advantage of the perception of insecurity in these societies and ruled arbitrarily. The new nationalism is a grassroots effort and not elite based.   It involves patriotism and pride that are based on the idea that through collective efforts, modern society and its institutions can be built. These societies are dedicated to democratic norms, respect for rights, a commitment to the rule of law, accountability, and a pluralistic participatory political model. During the period of their revolution, Egyptians were continuously declaring their pride in being Egyptian. That sense of pride, which was based on their achievement of establishing a free society, could be maintained for positive engagement in a new political experience.  Modernity and modern society for the revolutionaries in the Middle East means a break with the past in which colonialism, authoritarianism and foreign influence brought into being societies, politics and governments that alienated them and took away from them any sense of security and pride. With efforts aimed at establishing viable, accountable governments based on democratic norms, the Arab Revolutions could build new societies in which their dignity and pride will be restored.  

The Code of the Hills

It’s not Abbottabad the United States should be worried about.

BY AKBAR AHMED | MAY 6, 2011

The killing of Osama bin Laden has thrust the town of Abbottabad, Pakistan, into the international spotlight. However surprising it may be to find al Qaeda's notorious leader not in a cave in the tribal areas but in a comfortable villa near the capital, it is perhaps fitting that Abbottabad is having its 15 minutes of fame. The hill resort town -- named after Maj. James Abbott, the first British deputy commissioner who arrived there in the mid-19th century -- is a perfect example of one side of the cultural divide that now defines Pakistan.

When I arrived in Abbottabad to enter boarding school at Burn Hall, a century after Abbott, it was a bustling town with retired officials living in neat homes, a golf course, and, of course, the famous Pakistan Military Academy. I was later posted there as assistant commissioner under training for the Pakistani government, in the late 1960s, a post that oversaw judicial, revenue and law and order matters. There could have been no town more integrated into the state than Abbottabad.

A decade later, I found myself in charge of a region that could not be more different: South Waziristan. While Abbottabad's population is a mixture of ethnic Pashtun tribesmen and Punjabi settlers, Waziristan is made up entirely of Pashtuns. The Waziristan tribes, who were long suspected of providing a safe haven for bin Laden, have long felt that they possess their own history, culture, code of behavior, and identity that are distinct from the Pakistani nation-state. When I would ask the elders of Waziristan why they resisted the modern state, they would reply good-humoredly, "Why do you wish to impose the corrupt police and revenue officials of Pakistan on us, while at the same time taking away our freedom?"

It is crucial to understand the dynamics that differentiate these two very different parts of Pakistan now associated in the world media with bin Laden. Only by more successfully navigating the tension between the two regions, and between tribe and state in Pakistan, will the United States have any hope of stabilizing South Asia.

An old Pashtun proverb sums up the historical divide well: "Honor (nang) ate up the mountains, taxes (qalang) ate up the plains." The proverb means that tribesmen living in the mountains, where the government has little sway, destroy each other in tribal warfare over honor. Meanwhile, the settled populations below are subject to the dominance of the state, and are suppressed through oppressive taxes, or qalang.

Qalang societies live in plains, on irrigated lands that are often fed by big rivers, and their economies are integrated by highways into market towns. These people pay rents and taxes and live within the state system in hierarchal societies that are dominated by powerful feudal, political, or military authority. Unlike in the mountain areas, leaders in qalang societies have their status bestowed on them by birth or through economic or political means.

Pakistan's military and intelligence elite, who are overwhelmingly from the qalang areas and are the ultimate instruments of the state, consider bin Laden and his affiliates, al Qaeda and the Taliban, as terrorists. They loathed bin Laden not only because he was on top of the wanted list of the United States for the 9/11 attacks, but because he had wrought death and destruction in Pakistan as well. Although the Taliban were patronized by Pakistani intelligence in the 1990s, as "our boys," after 9/11, the 180 degree turn against them as Islamabad was pressured into getting in line with U.S. policy, resulted in a complicated and bitter relationship.

For this reason, bin Laden's voyage from nang into qalang society may not have been entirely voluntary. It is likely that at some point, Pakistani intelligence successfully convinced him to move as their "guest" to one of their "safe houses" there -- which may explain reports that bin Laden arrived in Abbottabad as long as six years ago. He was now vulnerable because he was at the mercy of his hosts -- who would have seen him not as a guest to be honored, but as a commodity or asset to be bartered for gain with the Americans at the right time.

Nang people, on the other hand, make up bin Laden's natural constituency. They live in scarcely populated mountains that are largely inaccessible to the central government. They have a pastoral economy that depends on goats and camels, and do not pay rents or taxes. Their societies exist outside the state's legal systems, yet are egalitarian. Elders must earn their status through acts of honor and bravery, and problems are adjudicated by the jirga, or counsel of wise men or elders.

More than anything, the nang prize their freedom. Even under British rule, the authority's jurisdiction rarely exceeded more than 100 yards on either side of the main roads. In the most profound sense, the nang people were probably among the freest in the world.

When bin Laden first consolidated his organization in South Asia, he made sure to locate his military headquarters in a nang area -- Afghanistan's Tora Bora. When he was pursued by U.S. troops following their invasion of Afghanistan, he reportedly crossed into Waziristan -- another nang area, this time in Pakistan. Waziristan, of all the tribal agencies, has the toughest terrain and the toughest tribes, which enjoyed a reputation for maintaining fierce independence from any outside forces.

In Waziristan, bin Laden would have been invisible. In all his recent photographs, the al Qaeda leader looked and dressed like a typical nang elder and, unless someone heard him speak Arabic, he would have been difficult to identify as an outsider.

The people of nang would see bin Laden through the prism of their code of hospitality. Even if he had outworn his welcome, they would be constrained from betraying a guest. Besides, many nang tribesmen were actively involved in fighting NATO forces in Afghanistan, seeing them as invaders of Pashtun lands. Even non-combatants would have general sympathy for a man like bin Laden, who was viewed as courageous for standing up to the West and sacrificing his wealth for a noble cause.

Due to their radically different perspectives, both nang and qalang peoples tend to look down on each other. Nang see qalang folk as having compromised their freedom, and therefore their identity. The qalang see those from the nang areas as backward and barbaric people who will inevitably succumb to the march of history and be absorbed by the state.

One of the many dynamics that bin Laden's death should highlight for us is this distinction and tension between nang and qalang groups. Without a better understanding of it, Afghanistan and Pakistan's battles against their nang populations will continue to generate death and destruction. The nang have never been vanquished -- and never will, even at great cost to themselves. Their region is a graveyard of conquering invaders.

When U.S. troops invaded Afghanistan, they were inadvertently fighting two wars: their own war on terror and, unconsciously, another war, this one against the nang Pashtun tribes of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The deeper they sank into the quicksand of the Afghan war, the more blurred the American objectives became. The nang tribes on both sides of the border soon saw this as an all out war against the Pashtun tribes. The Taliban grew in popularity as Pashtuns began to see them as their champions, in spite of the violence occasionally perpetrated against them.

Because Islam is such a central part of Pashtun identity, it was easy to add the notion that the United States was on the warpath against Islam. Mutilating Pashtun bodies, desecrating the Quran, dropping bombs from 30,000 feet, and killing women and children fed the perception that Americans were not people of honor, and it invoked the code of revenge. There is a Pashtun saying: "I took revenge after 100 years, and I took it too soon."

To make matters worse, U.S. experts, policy advisors, officers, and diplomats, blind to these aspects of tribal identity, raised thousands of non-Pashtun police and army units to supervise the Pashtun areas, thus consolidating the idea in the minds of the Pashtun that the Americans were out to destroy them through their enemies. And because Americans did not understand that this region had been dominated by Pashtun for centuries (the very name "Afghanistan" means the land of the Afghan or Pashtun) they could not understand the resentment.

Kabul and Islamabad, as well as Washington, need to devise a different way of dealing with the nang populations. Americans need to begin to think of a post bin Laden and even post war on terror scenario in Afghanistan and Pakistan; building up and maintaining goodwill is crucial if the United States is to maintain some influence in the future. Americans need to rapidly learn about the dynamic of nang and qalang and the complex relationship of the state with its tribes.

They must take action to show respect for what is respected in nang areas -- the lives of women and children, the Quran -- and ensure that the Pashtun sense of tribal identity and autonomy is not threatened. They should consult the elders and utilize the jirga in order to introduce schools and health schemes within their traditional systems so that the people of the nang areas have a sense of hope for the future. The extensive network of madrassas in the nang areas -- which are sometimes the only source of education for young Pashtuns -- should be reformed through the jirgas and elders, their syllabi and teacher training programs improved, and boys given a chance for scholarships.

But more than anything, America needs to understand the importance of Pashtunwali and operate through it. People who see themselves through the lens of honor will respond positively if they are treated honorably.

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As part of its Female Author Series, the World Affairs Council presents a discussion Jan. 24 with noted author Dr. Haleh Esfandiari.